The nucleon of cooperative games and an algorithm for matching games

U. Faigle, Walter Kern, Sándor P. Fekete, Winfried Hochstättler

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21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The nucleon is introduced as a new allocation concept for non-negative cooperativen-person transferable utility games. The nucleon may be viewed as the multiplicative analogue of Schmeidler’s nucleolus. It is shown that the nucleon of (not necessarily bipartite) matching games can be computed in polynomial time.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)195-211
Number of pages17
JournalMathematical programming
Volume83
Issue number1-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Keywords

  • IR-79987
  • METIS-140545
  • Cooperative game - Core - Nucleolus - Nucleon - Matching

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