The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Peter Sudhölter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    It is well-known that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games is characterized by singlevaluedness, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, and the reduced game property. We show that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to communication structures may be characterized by the same axioms and a stronger version of independence of non-connected coalitions requiring that the solution does not depend on the worth of any non-connected coalition. Similarly as in the classical case, it turns out that each of the five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms and that an infinite universe of potential players is necessary. Moreover, a suitable definition and characterization of a prekernel for games with communication structures is presented.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)285-299
    Number of pages15
    JournalMathematical methods of operations research
    Volume78
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013

    Keywords

    • Nucleolus
    • Kernel
    • TU game
    • Communication and conference structure
    • Solution concept

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