The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines

Ruben Pieter Hoeksma; Marc Uetz

doi:10.1016/j.disopt.2018.08.001

The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines

Ruben Pieter Hoeksma^*
, Marc Uetz

^*Corresponding author for this work

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

220 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We present bounds on the efficiency of Nash equilibria in a scheduling game where jobs are players who choose a machine out of a set of machines to be processed on. Machines may have different speeds, and sequence the jobs in shortest processing time first order. When players selfishly choose a machine to minimize their own completion time, we analyze the price of anarchy for the sum of the completion times of the jobs. We show that it is bounded from below by e∕(e−1)≈1.58 and from above by 2.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	29-39
Number of pages	11
Journal	Discrete optimization
Volume	31
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disopt.2018.08.001
Publication status	Published - 1 Feb 2019

Keywords

Price of anarchy
Related machines
Scheduling
Utilitarian

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AB - We present bounds on the efficiency of Nash equilibria in a scheduling game where jobs are players who choose a machine out of a set of machines to be processed on. Machines may have different speeds, and sequence the jobs in shortest processing time first order. When players selfishly choose a machine to minimize their own completion time, we analyze the price of anarchy for the sum of the completion times of the jobs. We show that it is bounded from below by e∕(e−1)≈1.58 and from above by 2.

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The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines

Abstract

Keywords

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