The sequential price of anarchy for affine congestion games with few players

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Abstract

This paper determines the sequential price of anarchy for Rosenthal congestion games with affine cost functions and few players. We show that for two players, the sequential price of anarchy equals 1.5, and for three players it equals approximately 2.13. While the case with two players is analyzed analytically, the tight bound for three players is based on the explicit computation of a worst-case instance using linear programming. The basis for both results are combinatorial arguments to show that finite worst-case instances exist.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-139
Number of pages7
JournalOperations research letters
Volume47
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019

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Congestion Games
Price of Anarchy
Cost functions
Linear programming
Combinatorial argument
Affine Function
Approximately equal
Cost Function
Price of anarchy
Congestion games
Cost function

Cite this

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title = "The sequential price of anarchy for affine congestion games with few players",
abstract = "This paper determines the sequential price of anarchy for Rosenthal congestion games with affine cost functions and few players. We show that for two players, the sequential price of anarchy equals 1.5, and for three players it equals approximately 2.13. While the case with two players is analyzed analytically, the tight bound for three players is based on the explicit computation of a worst-case instance using linear programming. The basis for both results are combinatorial arguments to show that finite worst-case instances exist.",
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The sequential price of anarchy for affine congestion games with few players. / de Jong, Jasper ; Uetz, Marc Jochen.

In: Operations research letters, Vol. 47, No. 2, 03.2019, p. 133-139.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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