Threshold Implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 S-boxes

Begül Bilgin; S.I. Nikova; Vincent Rijmen; Ventzislav Nikov; Georg Stütz

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5

Threshold Implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 S-boxes

Begül Bilgin, S.I. Nikova, Vincent Rijmen, Ventzislav Nikov, Georg Stütz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

96 Citations (Scopus)

1 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Side-channel attacks have proven many hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms to be vulnerable. A recently proposed masking method, based on secret sharing and multi-party computation methods, introduces a set of sufficient requirements for implementations to be provably resistant against first-order DPA with minimal assumptions on the hardware. The original paper doesn’t describe how to construct the Boolean functions that are to be used in the implementation. In this paper, we derive the functions for all invertible 3 ×3, 4 ×4 S-boxes and the 6 ×4 DES S-boxes. Our methods and observations can also be used to accelerate the search for sharings of larger (e.g. 8 ×8) S-boxes. Finally, we investigate the cost of such protection.

Original language	Undefined
Title of host publication	Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012
Editors	E. Prouff, P. Schaumont
Place of Publication	Berlin, Germany
Publisher	Springer
Pages	76-91
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-33026-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5
Publication status	Published - 2012
Event	Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012 - Leuven, Belgium Duration: 9 Sept 2012 → 12 Sept 2012

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Volume	7428

Workshop

Workshop	Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012
Period	9/09/12 → 12/09/12
Other	9-12 September 2012

Keywords

EWI-24463
IR-89341
METIS-302703
SCS-Cybersecurity

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5

http://eprints.eemcs.utwente.nl/secure2/24463/01/978-3-642-33027-8_5.pdf

Cite this

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title = "Threshold Implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 S-boxes",

abstract = "Side-channel attacks have proven many hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms to be vulnerable. A recently proposed masking method, based on secret sharing and multi-party computation methods, introduces a set of sufficient requirements for implementations to be provably resistant against first-order DPA with minimal assumptions on the hardware. The original paper doesn{\textquoteright}t describe how to construct the Boolean functions that are to be used in the implementation. In this paper, we derive the functions for all invertible 3 ×3, 4 ×4 S-boxes and the 6 ×4 DES S-boxes. Our methods and observations can also be used to accelerate the search for sharings of larger (e.g. 8 ×8) S-boxes. Finally, we investigate the cost of such protection.",

keywords = "EWI-24463, IR-89341, METIS-302703, SCS-Cybersecurity",

author = "Beg{\"u}l Bilgin and S.I. Nikova and Vincent Rijmen and Ventzislav Nikov and Georg St{\"u}tz",

note = "10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5 ; Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012 ; Conference date: 09-09-2012 Through 12-09-2012",

year = "2012",

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language = "Undefined",

isbn = "978-3-642-33026-1",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

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Bilgin, B, Nikova, SI, Rijmen, V, Nikov, V & Stütz, G 2012, Threshold Implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 S-boxes. in E Prouff & P Schaumont (eds), Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7428, Springer, Berlin, Germany, pp. 76-91, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012, 9/09/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_5

Threshold Implementations of all 3×3 and 4×4 S-boxes. / Bilgin, Begül; Nikova, S.I.; Rijmen, Vincent et al.
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2012. ed. / E. Prouff; P. Schaumont. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2012. p. 76-91 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 7428).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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