Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

Florian Kammüller; Manfred Kerber; Christian W. Probst

doi:10.1145/2995959.2995963

Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

Florian Kammüller, Manfred Kerber, Christian W. Probst

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats
Place of Publication	New York
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	23-34
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4503-4571-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2995959.2995963
Publication status	Published - Oct 2016
Event	8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016 - Vienna, Austria Duration: 24 Oct 2016 → 28 Oct 2016 Conference number: 8

Workshop

Workshop	8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016
Abbreviated title	ACM MIST 2016
Country/Territory	Austria
City	Vienna
Period	24/10/16 → 28/10/16

Keywords

Formal Methods
METIS-318568
EWI-27342
EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013
IR-101829
Insider Threat
EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003
Auctions

Access to Document

10.1145/2995959.2995963

Cite this

@inproceedings{ee3d51fb32a047a3adc35aa69469bb6e,

title = "Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions",

abstract = "This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.",

keywords = "Formal Methods, METIS-318568, EWI-27342, EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013, IR-101829, Insider Threat, EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003, Auctions",

author = "Florian Kamm{\"u}ller and Manfred Kerber and Probst, {Christian W.}",

year = "2016",

month = oct,

doi = "10.1145/2995959.2995963",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-1-4503-4571-2",

pages = "23--34",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats",

publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",

address = "United States",

note = "8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016, ACM MIST 2016 ; Conference date: 24-10-2016 Through 28-10-2016",

}

Kammüller, F, Kerber, M & Probst, CW 2016, Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions. in Proceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, pp. 23-34, 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016, Vienna, Austria, 24/10/16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2995959.2995963

Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions. / Kammüller, Florian; Kerber, Manfred; Probst, Christian W.
Proceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats. New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2016. p. 23-34.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

AU - Kammüller, Florian

AU - Kerber, Manfred

AU - Probst, Christian W.

N1 - Conference code: 8

PY - 2016/10

Y1 - 2016/10

N2 - This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.

AB - This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.

KW - Formal Methods

KW - METIS-318568

KW - EWI-27342

KW - EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013

KW - IR-101829

KW - Insider Threat

KW - EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003

KW - Auctions

U2 - 10.1145/2995959.2995963

DO - 10.1145/2995959.2995963

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-1-4503-4571-2

SP - 23

EP - 34

BT - Proceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

CY - New York

T2 - 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016

Y2 - 24 October 2016 through 28 October 2016

ER -

Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

Abstract

Workshop

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this