Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

Florian Kammüller, Manfred Kerber, Christian W. Probst

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)
    1 Downloads (Pure)


    This paper brings together the world of insider threats and auctions. For online-auction systems, like eBay, but also for high-value one-off auction algorithms as they are used for selling radio wave frequencies, the use of rigorous machine supported modelling and verification techniques is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use the cocaine auction protocol that represents a nice combination of cryptographic techniques, protocols, and privacy goals suitable for highlighting insider threats for auctions.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2016 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats
    Place of PublicationNew York
    PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
    Number of pages12
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-4571-2
    Publication statusPublished - Oct 2016
    Event8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016 - Vienna, Austria
    Duration: 24 Oct 201628 Oct 2016
    Conference number: 8


    Workshop8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats 2016
    Abbreviated titleACM MIST 2016


    • Formal Methods
    • METIS-318568
    • EWI-27342
    • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013
    • IR-101829
    • Insider Threat
    • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003
    • Auctions


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