Two axiomatizations of the kernel of TU games: bilateral and converse reduced game properties

Theo Driessen, C.-C. Hu

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Abstract

We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the kernel of TU games by means of both bilateral consistency and converse consistency with respect to two types of two-person reduced games. According to the first type, the worth of any single player in the two-person reduced game is derived from the difference of player's positive (instead of maximum) surpluses. According to the second type, the worth of any single player in the two-person reduced game either coincides with the two-person max reduced game or refers to the constrained equal loss rule applied to an appropriate two-person bankruptcy problem, the claims of which are given by the player's positve surpluses.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished - May 2006

Publication series

NameMemorandum Faculty of Mathematical Sciences
PublisherDepartment of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente
No.1799
ISSN (Print)0169-2690

Keywords

  • MSC-91A12
  • IR-66580
  • METIS-237576
  • EWI-8054

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