Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Theo Driessen, Daniël Paulusma

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Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameMemorandum / Department of Applied Mathematics
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Faculty of Mathematical Sciences
ISSN (Print)0169-2690


  • MSC-90D40
  • IR-65683
  • EWI-3314
  • MSC-90D12

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