Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure

Rong Zou, Wenzhong Li, Marc Uetz*, Genjiu Xu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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This paper proposes an alternative for the two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structure that has earlier been proposed by Kamijo. The value is based on the idea that within a union of players, worth should be distributed based on the solidarity principle. Specifically, we propose a two-step Shapley-solidarity value, in which the surplus of a union’s Shapley value in the quotient game is distributed equally among the union’s members, and players obtain the solidarity value of the respective subgame within their union. We provide an intuitive procedural characterization for this value and give three axiomatizations to pinpoint the differences to comparable values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1–25
Number of pages25
JournalOR Spectrum
Early online date17 Oct 2022
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2023


  • Axiomatization
  • Coalition structure
  • Cooperative games
  • Procedural characterization
  • Solidarity
  • UT-Hybrid-D

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