Abstract
Nowadays, neo-institutionalistic approaches are prominent in economics, the political science, the science of public administration, and sociology. There is a general complaint about the vagueness of the concept of institutions and the apparent disparity of phenomena falling under it. This article shows how institutional legal theory provides a typology of institutions as sets of rules and corresponding patterns of regulated behaviour that can help to avert much confusion. The typology's usefulness is tested by applying it to the array of private governance structures 'market', 'hybrid', and 'firm' distinguished by transaction cost economics.Key words: governance, institution, institutional legal theory, legal person, neo-institutionalism, organization, rules of the games, transaction cost economics
| Original language | Undefined |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 207-231 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Res publica : a journal of moral, legal and social philosophy |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - 2004 |
Keywords
- METIS-220425