Abstract

As the critical systems we rely on every day, such as nuclear power plants and airplanes, become ever more complex, the need to rigorously verify the safety and dependability of these systems is becoming very clear. Furthermore, deliberate attacks have become a prominent cause of concern for safety and reliability. One of the most prominent techniques for analyzing such systems is fault tree analysis (FTA), and a whole forest of variants, extensions, and analysis tools have been developed. In the security field, FTA was the inspiration for attack trees, used to analyze systems for vulnerability to malicious attacks. These formalisms are rarely compatible, making it difficult to exploit their different strengths in analyzing the same system. The key contribution of this paper is a meta-model describing many varieties of fault and attack trees, and well as combined attack-fault trees. We provide translations to and from different formalisms, as well as our own analysis engine for combined models. We demonstrate this framework on three case studies.
Original languageUndefined
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 23 Jan 2017

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Fault tree analysis
Nuclear power plants
Aircraft
Engines
Side channel attack

Keywords

  • EWI-27223
  • Metamodelling
  • Fault Tree Analysis
  • Attack-fault trees
  • IR-101865
  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003

Cite this

@misc{e08391afc3034f75b795a9136ab24f73,
title = "Uniform analysis of fault trees through model transformations",
abstract = "As the critical systems we rely on every day, such as nuclear power plants and airplanes, become ever more complex, the need to rigorously verify the safety and dependability of these systems is becoming very clear. Furthermore, deliberate attacks have become a prominent cause of concern for safety and reliability. One of the most prominent techniques for analyzing such systems is fault tree analysis (FTA), and a whole forest of variants, extensions, and analysis tools have been developed. In the security field, FTA was the inspiration for attack trees, used to analyze systems for vulnerability to malicious attacks. These formalisms are rarely compatible, making it difficult to exploit their different strengths in analyzing the same system. The key contribution of this paper is a meta-model describing many varieties of fault and attack trees, and well as combined attack-fault trees. We provide translations to and from different formalisms, as well as our own analysis engine for combined models. We demonstrate this framework on three case studies.",
keywords = "EWI-27223, Metamodelling, Fault Tree Analysis, Attack-fault trees, IR-101865, EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003",
author = "Ruijters, {Enno Jozef Johannes} and Stefano Schivo and Stoelinga, {Mariëlle Ida Antoinette} and Arend Rensink",
note = "Foreground = 25%; Type of activity = conference; Main leader = UT; Type of audience = scientific community; Size of audience = 40; Countries addressed = international;",
year = "2017",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1109/RAM.2017.7889759",

}

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AU - Schivo,Stefano

AU - Stoelinga,Mariëlle Ida Antoinette

AU - Rensink,Arend

N1 - Foreground = 25%; Type of activity = conference; Main leader = UT; Type of audience = scientific community; Size of audience = 40; Countries addressed = international;

PY - 2017/1/23

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N2 - As the critical systems we rely on every day, such as nuclear power plants and airplanes, become ever more complex, the need to rigorously verify the safety and dependability of these systems is becoming very clear. Furthermore, deliberate attacks have become a prominent cause of concern for safety and reliability. One of the most prominent techniques for analyzing such systems is fault tree analysis (FTA), and a whole forest of variants, extensions, and analysis tools have been developed. In the security field, FTA was the inspiration for attack trees, used to analyze systems for vulnerability to malicious attacks. These formalisms are rarely compatible, making it difficult to exploit their different strengths in analyzing the same system. The key contribution of this paper is a meta-model describing many varieties of fault and attack trees, and well as combined attack-fault trees. We provide translations to and from different formalisms, as well as our own analysis engine for combined models. We demonstrate this framework on three case studies.

AB - As the critical systems we rely on every day, such as nuclear power plants and airplanes, become ever more complex, the need to rigorously verify the safety and dependability of these systems is becoming very clear. Furthermore, deliberate attacks have become a prominent cause of concern for safety and reliability. One of the most prominent techniques for analyzing such systems is fault tree analysis (FTA), and a whole forest of variants, extensions, and analysis tools have been developed. In the security field, FTA was the inspiration for attack trees, used to analyze systems for vulnerability to malicious attacks. These formalisms are rarely compatible, making it difficult to exploit their different strengths in analyzing the same system. The key contribution of this paper is a meta-model describing many varieties of fault and attack trees, and well as combined attack-fault trees. We provide translations to and from different formalisms, as well as our own analysis engine for combined models. We demonstrate this framework on three case studies.

KW - EWI-27223

KW - Metamodelling

KW - Fault Tree Analysis

KW - Attack-fault trees

KW - IR-101865

KW - EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003

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DO - 10.1109/RAM.2017.7889759

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