Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure

Research output: Book/ReportReport

Abstract

We consider a new model for TU games with both coalition and cooperation structures that applies to different network situations, in particular, to sharing an international river with multiple users without international firms. Our approach to the value for such a game is close to that of Myerson and is based on ideas of component efficiency and fairness adopted to graph situations under scrutiny, and it incorporates also the idea of the intermediate game property of the Owen value. The newly axiomatically introduced values have an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. We apply the results obtained to the problem of sharing an international river among multiple users without international firms.
LanguageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
Number of pages18
StatePublished - Jul 2007

Publication series

NameMemorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics
No.1848
ISSN (Print)1874-4850

Keywords

  • EWI-10756
  • MSC-91A12
  • METIS-256073
  • IR-64246
  • Component efficiency
  • TU game
  • Cooperation structure
  • Fairness
  • Myerson value
  • Harsanyi dividends
  • Owen value
  • Coalition structure

Cite this

Khmelnitskaya, A. B. (2007). Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure. (Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics; No. 1848). Enschede: University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics.
Khmelnitskaya, Anna Borisovna. / Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure. Enschede : University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2007. 18 p. (Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics; 1848).
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Khmelnitskaya, AB 2007, Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure. Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics, no. 1848, University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, Enschede.

Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure. / Khmelnitskaya, Anna Borisovna.

Enschede : University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2007. 18 p. (Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics; No. 1848).

Research output: Book/ReportReport

TY - BOOK

T1 - Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure

AU - Khmelnitskaya,Anna Borisovna

PY - 2007/7

Y1 - 2007/7

N2 - We consider a new model for TU games with both coalition and cooperation structures that applies to different network situations, in particular, to sharing an international river with multiple users without international firms. Our approach to the value for such a game is close to that of Myerson and is based on ideas of component efficiency and fairness adopted to graph situations under scrutiny, and it incorporates also the idea of the intermediate game property of the Owen value. The newly axiomatically introduced values have an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. We apply the results obtained to the problem of sharing an international river among multiple users without international firms.

AB - We consider a new model for TU games with both coalition and cooperation structures that applies to different network situations, in particular, to sharing an international river with multiple users without international firms. Our approach to the value for such a game is close to that of Myerson and is based on ideas of component efficiency and fairness adopted to graph situations under scrutiny, and it incorporates also the idea of the intermediate game property of the Owen value. The newly axiomatically introduced values have an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. We apply the results obtained to the problem of sharing an international river among multiple users without international firms.

KW - EWI-10756

KW - MSC-91A12

KW - METIS-256073

KW - IR-64246

KW - Component efficiency

KW - TU game

KW - Cooperation structure

KW - Fairness

KW - Myerson value

KW - Harsanyi dividends

KW - Owen value

KW - Coalition structure

M3 - Report

T3 - Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics

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PB - University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics

CY - Enschede

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Khmelnitskaya AB. Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure. Enschede: University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2007. 18 p. (Memorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics; 1848).