Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure

Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya

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We consider a new model for TU games with both coalition and cooperation structures that applies to different network situations, in particular, to sharing an international river with multiple users without international firms. Our approach to the value for such a game is close to that of Myerson and is based on ideas of component efficiency and fairness adopted to graph situations under scrutiny, and it incorporates also the idea of the intermediate game property of the Owen value. The newly axiomatically introduced values have an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. We apply the results obtained to the problem of sharing an international river among multiple users without international firms.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2007

Publication series

NameMemorandum of the Department of Applied Mathematics
ISSN (Print)1874-4850


  • EWI-10756
  • MSC-91A12
  • METIS-256073
  • IR-64246
  • Component efficiency
  • TU game
  • Cooperation structure
  • Fairness
  • Myerson value
  • Harsanyi dividends
  • Owen value
  • Coalition structure

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