Voter discernment and candidate entry in pluralitarian election

Bernard Steunenberg, Roger D. Congleton

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)


    The paper develops a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. We analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions. In the cases examined, open elections for “important” positions attract the entry of more than two candidates. Moreover, myopic entry often generates electoral outcomes which depart from the median-mean outcomes of the conventional models. These results are consistent with the observed diversity of candidates in presidential and other significant primary elections which contrasts with many previous analyses of electoral entry.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)287-305
    Number of pages19
    JournalPublic choice
    Publication statusPublished - 1998


    • Previous analysis
    • Public finance
    • Conventional model
    • Significant primary election
    • Sequential model

    Cite this