Abstract
The present path of weapon innovation, meant to increase national security, may actually undermine it. Present arms control negotiations, such as the
CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), focus on reductions of troops and existing conventional weapons. In a situation of reduced levels of armament, qualitative changes arising from weapon innovations may pose an even greater threat to stability and thus to (inter)national security. Up till now these have not been part of arms control negotiations.
This article explores how to make arms control considerations part and parcel of the military technological innovation process. It introduces the specifically well-defined concept of 'guiding principle' as an instrument for decentralized control
of innovation in military technology and applies theoretical constructs (notably a network analysis) from the sociology of technology to analyze the developmental process of the European Fighter Aircraft and its radar.
CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), focus on reductions of troops and existing conventional weapons. In a situation of reduced levels of armament, qualitative changes arising from weapon innovations may pose an even greater threat to stability and thus to (inter)national security. Up till now these have not been part of arms control negotiations.
This article explores how to make arms control considerations part and parcel of the military technological innovation process. It introduces the specifically well-defined concept of 'guiding principle' as an instrument for decentralized control
of innovation in military technology and applies theoretical constructs (notably a network analysis) from the sociology of technology to analyze the developmental process of the European Fighter Aircraft and its radar.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 171-193 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Science and public policy |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 1990 |