In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show that the classical Deegan-Packel index, which was proposed as an alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index, in fact coincides with the Shapley value of some specific game determined by the set of minimal winning coalitions, and therefore, it has close affinities with the Shapley-Shubik index. We investigate monotonicity properties of the weighted Deegan-Packel index and introduce easy to check conditions under which it is monotonic with respect to the players' weights. An axiomatic characterization of the weighted Deegan-Packel index is provided. The computations done for three real-life examples from realm of politics demonstrate clearly the coincidence of our theoretical predictions with the reality.
|Publisher||University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics|
- simple games
- Deegan-Packel power index
- party's weight
- communication graph