What explains regional variation in election fraud? Evidence from Russia: a research note

Max Bader, C.T. van Ham

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The December 2011 legislative election was among the most fraudulent national elections in Russia since the communist period. The fraud, however, was not evenly spread across the country. Precinct-level election returns from the 83 regions of the Russian Federation suggest that the level of fraud ranged from minimal or small in some regions to extreme in some others, with moderate to high fraud levels in many regions in between. We argue that in an electoral authoritarian context like Russia, regional variation in fraud can be explained by differences in (a) the perceived need by regional authorities to signal loyalty to the center by “delivering” desired election results; (b) the capacity of regional authorities to organize fraud; and (c) the vulnerability of citizens to political pressure and manipulation. We test the effect of signaling, capacity, and vulnerability on electoral fraud in the 2011 legislative elections with data on the 83 regions of the Russian Federation. We find evidence for all three mechanisms, finding that the tenure of governors in office, United Russia's dominance in regional legislatures, and the ethnic composition of regions are most important for explaining regional variation in electoral fraud
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)514-528
JournalPost-Soviet affairs
Volume31
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Oct 2015

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Keywords

  • IR-92330
  • METIS-306136

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