Abstract
Legislators typically control the design of political institutions, and can be expected to craft rules that work to their advantage. In some nations, however, legislators adopt provisions for direct democracy-an institu- tion that might weaken the control that established parties and incum- bents have over political agendas. We examine the nature of legislative support for direct democracy by surveying legislators and legislative can- didates in Canada, New Zealand and the United States. We find that sup- port is conditioned by factors internal to the legislative setting (affiliation with a governing party, incumbency, and tenure) and by ideology and subjective attitudes about democracy We discuss how our findings relate to broader questions about when elites might change democratic institu- tions they control.
| Original language | Undefined |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 731-754 |
| Journal | Political Research Quarterly |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Keywords
- IR-60171
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