Why genes are like lemons

F. Boem, E. Ratti*, M. Andreoletti, G. Boniolo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, "What is a biological function?", we argue that the question "What is a gene?" could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)88-95
Number of pages8
JournalStudies in history and philosophy of science. Part C: Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences
Volume57
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Biological functions
  • Gene
  • Natural kinds
  • Philosophy of science contribution to science
  • Theoretical terms

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